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The Factual Basis for Indigenous Land Rights
Kent McNeil*
April 2021, forthcoming in the Monash University Law Review
Abstract: Groundbreaking judgments in Australia and Canada in the 1990s
reveal that Indigenous land rights depend on evidence of Indigenous
occupation and law when the British Crown asserted sovereignty. Looking
back at earlier Indigenous rights decisions, it is apparent that they were not
based on facts, but on prejudicial and erroneous assumptions about
Indigenous peoples. In St. Catherine’s Milling (1888), Lord Watson said the
rights of the Ojibwe Indians were based solely on the goodwill of the
Crown, a conclusion that evidently stemmed from the trial judge’s racist
assessment of Ojibwe society. In Cooper v Stuart (1889), Lord Watson
wrongly described New South Wales as a “territory practically unoccupied,
without settled inhabitants or settled law,” at the time it became a British
colony.
This article demonstrates that what was missing in the 1880s was not law
supporting Indigenous land rights, but rather evidence that should have led
to the application of existing law. Erroneous factual assumptions resulted in
legal precedents that led to the denial of Indigenous rights for around a
century. Nor is the impact of these precedents entirely spent. Even today,
false arguments are made that there was no basis in nineteenth-century
common law for Indigenous land rights.
Text
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In the past 30 years, the land rights of the Indigenous peoples of Australia
and Canada have been belatedly acknowledged and defined by the highest
courts in these countries. In 1992 in Mabo v Queensland [No 2],1 the High
Court of Australia decided for the first time that, in the absence of
extinguishment, the Torres Strait Islanders, and hence Indigenous peoples
elsewhere in Australia, have Native title at common law to the lands they
occupied and used in accordance with their own laws and customs at the
time of acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown.

In Canada,

although the Supreme Court had acknowledged the existence of Indigenous
land rights earlier,2 those rights were first defined by the Court in 1997 in
Delgamuukw v British Columbia3 and the first declaration of Aboriginal title
occurred as recently as 2014 in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia.4 A
major impediment to the acknowledgement of common law Indigenous land
rights in Canada was the Privy Council’s decision in St. Catherine’s Milling
and Lumber Company v The Queen,5 where Lord Watson had attributed
whatever land rights the Ojibwe people of north-western Ontario possessed
to the goodwill of the Crown as expressed in the Royal Proclamation of
1763. In Australia, judicial denial of Indigenous land rights stemmed largely
from the Privy Council’s 1889 decision in Cooper v Stuart,6 in which Lord
Watson described the colony of New South Wales as “practically
unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law” at the time it was
colonized by Great Britain.7
1

(1992) 175 CLR 1 [Mabo No 2].
E.g. in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313 [Calder]; Guerin v The Queen
[1984] 2 SCR 335 [Guerin].
3
[1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw].
4
[2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
5
(1888) 14 App Cas 46 [St. Catherine’s].
6
(1889) 14 App Cas 286.
7
Ibid at 291.
2
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This article examines Lord Watson’s decisions in these two cases
from the 1880s in order to understand the Privy Council’s reasons for
denying common law land rights to the Indigenous peoples of Canada and
Australia. Although some commentators have suggested that the decisions
were based on a lack of law supporting these rights,8 my analysis suggests
that what was missing in these cases was not law but evidence. In other
words, the Privy Council was unable to acknowledge Indigenous land rights
that had not been recognized or granted by the Crown (e.g. by the Royal
Proclamation in Canada) because the factual basis for these rights had not
been laid down at trial.

The article will start by examining the St.

Catherine’s case, then discuss Cooper v Stuart, and finish with a comparison
of the more recent case law.

1. The St. Catherine’s Case
(a) Backgound and Judgments
The St. Catherine’s case arose from a constitutional property dispute
between the Province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada over which
government benefitted from the surrender of Indigenous land rights to the
Crown by treaty.9 No Indigenous people were involved in the case, either as

8

E.g. see PG McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Paul McHugh & Lisa Ford, “Settler Sovereignty and the
Shapeshifting Crown,” in Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous and Settler Governance
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 23; David V Williams, “The Role of Legal History in Developing
New Zealand Common Law Following Paki (No 2)” [2016] NZ L Rev 755 at 777-87.
9
See Anthony J Hall, “The St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company versus the Queen: Indian Land
Rights as a Factor in Federal-Provincial Relations in Nineteenth-Century Canada”, in Kerry Abel & Jean
Friesen, eds, Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg: University of
Manitoba Press, 1991), 267-86; Sidney L Harring, White Man’s Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century
Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 125-47. This article draws on the
detailed discussion of the case, including the historical and political background, in Kent McNeil, Flawed
Precedent: The St. Catherine’s Case and Aboriginal Title (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).
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parties or witnesses, even though the nature of Aboriginal title to land was a
major issue. The Saulteaux tribe of the Ojibwe (Anishinaabe) people, who
had entered into Treaty 3 in 1873, were no doubt unaware even that the case
was been litigated. By the treaty’s written terms,10 they had agreed to give
up their land rights in return for reserves and other benefits, while retaining
hunting and fishing rights over the surrendered territory.11 The lands in
question in the case are in northwestern Ontario between Lake Superior and
the Lake of the Woods, within the geographical limits of the treaty.
The case was triggered by a grant in 1883 by the Crown in right of
Canada to the St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company of timber
harvesting rights near Wabigoon Lake. Ontario commenced legal action
against the company by way of an information of intrusion (a prerogative
action equivalent to an action for trespass), alleging that the timber licence
was void because the land, and therefore the standing timber, belonged to
the Crown in right of the province, not the federal Crown. Ontario claimed
that it owned the land by virtue of section 109 of the British North America
Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867),12 which provides that all public
lands belonging to the provinces prior to Confederation continue to belong
to them thereafter, with certain exceptions such as custom houses, post
10

Treaty 3, online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028675/1100100028679. On negotiation of
the treaty, see Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clark and Co., 1880; facsimile edition, Toronto: Coles Publishing Co,
1979), 44-76; Brian Walmark, “Alexander Morris and the Saulteaux: The Context and Making of Treaty
Three, 1869-73”, MA thesis, Department of History, Lakehead University, 1994, online:
http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/MQ52083.pdf.
11
The Saulteaux claim that the written terms do not accurately reflect the actual agreement, as their
intention was to share the land and resources rather than surrender them completely. For their
understanding of the treaty, see Tim Holzkamm & Leo Waisberg, “We Have Kept Our Part of the Treaty”:
The Anishinaabe Understanding of Treaty #3 (Kenora, ON: Grand Council Treaty #3, 2011), online: http://
www.ocsta.on.ca/ocsta/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/We-Have-Kept-Our-Part-Of-The-Treaty-Booklet.pdf.
See also Brittany Luby, “‘The Department Is Going Back on These Promises’: An Examination of
Anishinaabe and Crown Understandings of Treaty” (2010) 30:2 Can J Native Studies 203; Kate Gunn,
“Agreeing to Share: Treaty 3, History and the Courts” (2018) 51 UBC L Rev 75.
12
30 & 31 Vict, c 3 (Imp).
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offices, and military installations that were not relevant to the case.13 The
company, which became the proxy for the Canadian government,14 defended
by alleging in part that the Saulteaux had owned the lands prior to the treaty
and by that document had transferred them to the federal government that
had negotiated the treaty and accepted the surrender of the lands. The Privy
Council found for the province, holding that the surrender to the Crown had
extinguished the Aboriginal title and caused the underlying title that the
Crown in right of Ontario had by virtue of section 109 to become plenum
dominium – complete ownership.15 Lord Watson described the Crown’s
underlying title prior to the treaty as “a present proprietary estate in the land”
that was “substantial and paramount.”16
The “tenure of the Indians,” on the other hand, was more limited – it
was “a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the
Sovereign.”17 Lord Watson based this description of Aboriginal title on his
interpretation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which had reserved
unceded Indian lands for their use and forbade private purchases of and
settlement on those lands.18 He stated that the Saulteaux’s “possession, such
as it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal
proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty
and protection of the British Crown.”19 In other words, any land rights the
Indians had were the result of a positive act of the Crown – they were based
on the Crown’s bounty as sovereign. But what led the Privy Council to

13

Ibid. The exceptions are listed in the Third Schedule to the Act: see s 108.
Canada only joined the action on the final appeal to the Privy Council in 1888.
15
St. Catherine’s, above note 5 at 55.
16
Ibid at 55, 58.
17
Ibid at 54.
18
The Royal Proclamation is reproduced in RSC 1985, App II, No 1.
19
St. Catherine’s, supra note 5 at 54.
14
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ignore other potential sources of Aboriginal title, such as Indigenous law and
the common law?
The answer lies in the factual findings of the trial judge, Chancellor
Boyd. In his view, the
Indian peoples were found scattered wide-cast over the
continent, having, as a characteristic, no fixed abodes, but
moving as the exigencies of living demanded. As heathens and
barbarians it was not thought that they had any proprietary title
to the soil, nor any such claim thereto as to interfere with the
plantations, and the general prosecution of colonization.20
He said the Indians on reserves were “regarded no longer as in a wild and
primitive state, but as in a condition of transition from barbarism to
civilization.”21 Compared with them, the Saulteaux who entered into Treaty
3 were “wild and primitive” – they were “scattered bands of Ojibbeways,
most of them presenting a more than usually degraded Indian type.”22
Chancellor Boyd’s opinions of Indians in general and the Saulteaux in
particular sound very much like the assessments of the social evolution
theorists who had published speculative books on human societies in the
decade before the St. Catherine’s case went to court.23 Influenced by the
publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859, theorists
such as Edward Tylor, a leading proponent of social evolution, wrote in
1871 that progress and decline consisted of
… movement along a measured line from grade to grade of
actual savagery, barbarism, and civilization. The thesis which I
St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1885), 10 OR 196 (Ch) at 206 [St.
Catharine’s Ch].
21
Ibid. at 228.
22
Ibid at 227.
23
See Robert F Berkhofer Jr, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to
the Present (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1978), 33-69; George W Stocking Jr, Victorian Anthropology
(New York: Free Press, 1987); Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories
of Culture, updated ed (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001), 142-216.
20
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venture to sustain, within limits, is simply this, that the savage
state in some measure represents an early condition of mankind,
out of which the higher culture has gradually been developed or
evolved.24
Applying these ethnocentric standards of measurement, Lewis Henry
Morgan concluded in a book published in 1877 that “the American
aborigines” had
… commenced their career on the American continent in
savagery; and, although possessed of inferior mental
endowments, the body of them had emerged from savagery and
attained to the Lower Status of barbarism; whilst a portion of
them, the Village Indians of North and South America, had risen
to the Middle Status.25
Similarly, in Boyd C’s view, Indians who had not yet settled on reserves
were “wild” and “barbaric”, and so were too “primitive” to have any rights
to the lands they supposedly wandered over.
So what evidence was there to support Chancellor Boyd’s assessment
of the Saulteaux? The answer is, none at all. The only witness called in the
St. Catherine’s case was Alexander Morris, the head commissioner who
negotiated Treaty 3 on behalf of the government of Canada. His evidence,
the transcript of which is a scant two pages long, merely affirmed that the
treaty had been entered into.26

It did not provide any insight into the

Saulteaux way of life or their relationship with the land. Morris’s book, The
Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West

24

Edward B Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion,
Art, and Custom, 2 vols (London: John Murray, 1871), I, 28.
25
Lewis H Morgan, Ancient Society: or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, through
Barbarism to Civilization (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1877), 40. Morgan subdivided Tylor’s
categories of “savagery” and “barbarism” into three levels: lower, middle, and upper.
26
The transcript of Morris’s testimony is in the Supreme Court Appeal Book, In the Supreme Court of
Canada, Appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Between The Queen and St. Catharines Milling and
Lumber Company: Case (Toronto: Dudley & Burns, 1886), 10-12.
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Territories,27 containing an account of the treaty negotiations, was also put
in as evidence, but Boyd C did not refer to it in his judgment and it does not
appear to have influenced his decision. Apart from Morris’s book and brief
testimony, the case was argued entirely on documents submitted by counsel,
none of which appear to shed light on the Saulteaux whose land rights were
at issue in the case.28
So Chancellor Boyd’s perception of the Saulteaux as “wild”,
“primitive”, and “degraded” must have been based on assumptions rather
than facts – assumptions derived from social evolution theory and the racist
Eurocentric prejudices of the time. Those assumptions did not correspond
with the reality of Saulteaux life, which was governed by laws and involved
intensive use of and complex relationships with the land and the natural
resources in Saulteaux territory.29 And yet those erroneous assumptions
27

Supra note 10.
Counsel for the St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company relied in part on the judgments of Marshall
CJ in the US Supreme Court, particularly Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 5 Pet (30 US) 1 (1831), and
Worcester v Georgia, 6 Pet (31 US) 515 (1832). Boyd C cited instead a passage from Johnson v M’Intosh,
8 Wheat (21 US) 543 (1823) at 595-96, where Marshall CJ stated: “According to the theory of the British
constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the crown…. So far as respected the authority of the crown, no
distinction was taken between vacant lands and lands occupied by the Indians.” While the Chancellor
acknowledged that Marshall CJ had also said that “the absolute title of the Crown [is] subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy” (Johnson v M’Intosh at 588), in his opinion this “primitive right of occupancy,”
as he called it, was not a legal right: “the claim of the Indians by virtue of their original occupation is not
such as to give any title to the land itself, but only serves to commend them to the consideration and
liberality of the Government upon their displacement”: St. Catharine’s Ch, supra note 20 at 209, 229, 234.
In so deciding, Boyd C conveniently disregarded other passages in Johnson v M’Intosh, such as: “They [the
original inhabitants of North America] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion” (at 574). Justice
Strong, in the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, relied on Marshall CJ’s judgments, as well as on
Mitchell v United States, 9 Pet (34 US) 711 (1835), to reach a conclusion opposite to that of Boyd C, but
Strong J was dissenting: (1887) 13 SCR 577 at 610-12. Before the Privy Council, these American cases
were all cited again by counsel for Canada and the company, but they were not mentioned in Lord
Watson’s judgment. That is hardly surprising, as it would have been highly unlikely for Her Majesty’s
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to rely on the views of the US Supreme Court on the nature of the
Crown’s title to land in British North America.
29
For early works on the Ojibwe who include the Saulteaux, see Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur les moeurs,
coutumes et religion des sauvages de l’Amérique septentrionale (Paris: R.P. Tailhan, 1864, written before 1720
but previously unpublished), English translation in Emma Helen Blair, ed, The Indian Tribes of the Upper
Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 22-272;
George Copway, The Traditional History and Characteristic Sketches of the Ojibway Nation (Boston:
28
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were part of the “factual” record that was relied on by the appeal judges. In
the Ontario Court of Appeal, Chief Justice Hagarty praised the Chancellor,
stating that he had mapped out the field “with so much care and perspicacity
as to very much reduce the labours of subsequent investigators. We may
fully accept his historical treatment of the subject from the earliest period
down to the Confederation Act of 1867.”30 Justice Patterson echoed these
views.31

In the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Taschereau likewise

observed that Boyd C’s treatment of the issues was so thorough that he had
little to add.32

Justice Henry stated that he “entirely approve[d] of the

judgment of the learned chancellor, which, I think, embraces all the
important points in the case.”33

Reflecting the language in Boyd C’s

judgment, he concluded that “all wild lands, including those held by
nomadic tribes of Indians, were the property of the crown.” 34 “The Indians,”
he said, “were not in possession of any particular portion of the land,”35 a
factual finding that must have been based either on the Chancellor’s
assumptions about the Saulteaux’s relationship with the land or Justice
Benjamin B Mussey & Co, 1851); Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information,
Respecting the History, Conditions, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, Grambo, 1851); William W Warren, History of the Ojibways, Based upon Traditions and Oral
Statements (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1885), reprinted as History of the Ojibwa Peoples, with
an Introduction by W Roger Buffalohead (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1984). For more
recent discussions, see Harold Hickerson, “Land Tenure of the Rainy Lake Chippewa at the Beginning of
the 19th Century” (1967) 2:4 Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology 41; Robert E Ritzenthaler,
“Southwestern Chippewa”, in Bruce Trigger, ed, Handbook of North American Indians, vol 15, Northeast,
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 743; D Peter MacLeod, “The Anishinabeg Point of View:
The History of the Great Lakes Region to 1800 in Nineteenth Century Mississauga, Odawa, and Ojibwa
Historiography” (1992) 73 Can Hist Rev 194; Charles A Bishop, “Territorial Groups Before 1821: Cree
and Ojibwa”, in June Helm, ed, Subarctic, vol 6, Handbook of North American Indians, (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution, 1981), 158; Tim E Holzkamm & Leo G Waisberg, “Native American Utilization
of Sturgeon”, in Greg TO LeBreton, F William H Beamish & R Scott McKinley, eds, Sturgeons and
Paddlefish of North America (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 22 at 27-35; John Borrows,
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), especially 77-84.
30
St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1886), 13 OAR 148 at 148.
31
Ibid at 168-69.
32
St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1887), 13 SCR 577 at 643.
33
Ibid at 639.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid at 641.
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Henry’s own misinformed perceptions. Even Justice Strong, who wrote a
forceful dissent, seems to have accepted that Saulteaux society was
“lawless”.36
Lord Watson for the Privy Council avoided the racist language used
by Chancellor Boyd and did not heap praise on his judgment as some of the
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judges had done.

He nonetheless

concluded, as we have seen, that the Saulteaux’s “possession, such as it was,
can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal
proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty
and protection of the British Crown.”37 He therefore assumed that their
occupation and use of the land did not amount to the kind of possession that
would have given them real property rights at common law. In the English
legal system, possession is a root of title: anyone in possession of land is
presumed to have good title, rebuttable only by proof by another claimant
that he or she has a better title.38 Even a wrongdoer who has been in adverse
possession for less than the statutory limitation period has a title valid
against everyone (including the Crown39) except the true owner or others
who can establish that they have a better title.40
Moreover, possession does not require any particular use of the land.
In Red House Farms Ltd v Catchpole,41 the English Court of Appeal held

36

Ibid at 614.
St. Catherine’s, supra note 5 at 54 [my emphasis].
38
See Frederick Pollock & Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1888), 91-95. This is old law, going back to the medieval concept of seisin, the real
actions, and the possessory assizes: see AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), 37-44, 151-52; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987), ch 2 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title].
39
Perry v Clissold [2007] AC 73 (PC).
40
See Graham v Peat (1801) 1 East 244 (102 ER 95); Asher v Whitlock (1865) LR 1 QB 1; Bristow v
Cormican (1878) 3 App Cas 641 (HL Ir) per Lord Cairns at 651, Lord Hatherley at 657, Lord Blackburn at
660.
41
(1976) 244 EG 295.
37
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that hunting on marshy land and giving others permission to hunt were
sufficient to establish adverse possession.

In the Crown’s overseas

dominions, “the conditions of life and habits and ideas of the people” are
taken into account.42

In Wuta-Ofei v Danquah,43 where the acts of

occupation relied upon were placing markers at the four corners of the land,
keeping watch over it, and warning intruders off, the Privy Council found
those acts to be sufficient for possession, even though no use was being
made of the land. Lord Guest stated that their “Lordships do not consider
that in order to establish possession it is necessary for a claimant to take
some active step in relation to the land such as enclosing the land or
cultivating it. The type of conduct which indicates possession must vary
with the type of land.”44 So if adequate evidence of Saulteaux occupation in
accordance with their way of life had been presented at the St. Catherine’s
trial, they should have been accorded the possession necessary for title at
common law.45

(a) Case Law from other Dominions of the Crown
Lord Watson must have assumed that the Saulteaux did not have laws of
their own according them property rights that would have continued after the
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty.

Several cases before and after St.

Catherine’s, some of which were decided by the Privy Council, accepted the
applicability of local law to uphold land rights in the Crown’s dominions.
42

Cadija Umma v S Don Manis Appu [1939] AC 136 (PC, on appeal from Ceylon) at 141-42, per Sir
George Rankin.
43
[1961] 1 WLR 1238.
44
Ibid at 1243. Note that most of the land within Treaty 3 is rocky terrain covered by forest, lakes, and
rivers.
45
For detailed discussion of possession as a source of Indigenous land rights, see McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal Title, supra note 38, especially ch 7.
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Early examples concern the English conquests of Ireland and Wales where
English law had been introduced but local customary law was held to
continue to the extent that it was not unreasonable and did not offend
English conceptions of justice.46 Similarly, on the Isle of Man, acquired by
conquest by Edward III in the fourteenth century, the local-law right of the
inhabitants to dig clay and sand to make bricks for sale was held to prevail
against the Crown by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for the Isle of
Man v Mylchreest,47 decided just nine years before St. Catherine’s. Crown
grants of land were therefore subject to this right.

The decision was

delivered by Sir Montague E. Smith, who also sat on the St. Catherine’s
appeal. He observed that “[n]umerous witnesses, many of them of great age,
proved that clay and sand had been largely dug up, used, and sold by the
owners of the customary tenements.”48 The case in favour of the inhabitants
was thus decided on the evidence of customary law, in the absence of which
they would not have succeeded.49
Appeals to the Privy Council from the Crown’s overseas colonies
reveal the same acceptance of local land rights, whether based on custom or
longstanding possession, provided they are established by evidence.
Attorney-General for British Honduras v Bristowe,50 decided by the Privy
Council in 1880, involved an information of intrusion brought by the Crown
to acquire possession of land that had been devised to a community of

46

See Case of Tanistry (1608) Davis 28 (80 ER 516) (KB), 4th ed (Dublin, 1762) 78 (for English translation
from law French); Witrong v Blany (1674) 3 Keb 401 (84 ER 789).
47
(1879) 4 App Cas 294.
48
Ibid at 300.
49
Compare Attorney-General v Jones (1862) 33 LR Ex 249, involving an information of intrusion (as in
Mylchreest and St. Catherine’s), where the Crown claimed a prerogative right to a stretch of foreshore in
Wales. The defendant pleaded but was unable to establish a right based on the ancient Welsh law of Howel
Dda because the court did not accept the evidence of it: ibid at 257 n8.
50
(1880) 6 App Cas 143 [Bristowe]. For more detailed discussion, see McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal
Title, supra note 38 at 141-47.
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former slaves by their master’s will. At trial, Chief Justice Parker of the
British Honduras Supreme Court decided that the defendants had possessory
rights based on evidence of “continued occupancy and long industrial
possession,”51 and so dismissed the information. The Privy Council, in a
judgment delivered once again by Sir Montague E. Smith, upheld this
decision on the basis that the defendants had title by adverse possession
against the Crown for sixty years, the statutory limitation period set by the
English Nullum Tempus Act52 that applied in British Honduras. While not
disagreeing with Parker CJ’s decision that the defendants had title “by first
occupancy or otherwise,” their Lordships found it unnecessary to decide the
case on that basis, given the expiry of the statutory limitation period.53 It is
nonetheless evident from their judgment that, had the statutory defence not
been available, they would have found for the defendants in any case on the
basis of their longstanding possession, as had Parker CJ.
Privy Council decisions from New Zealand and Africa not long after
St. Catherine’s provide clear examples of acceptance of Indigenous land
rights based on customary law. In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker,54 decided by the
Privy Council in 1901, a member of the Rangitāne tribe in New Zealand
claimed native title on behalf of his tribe to a parcel of land in accordance
with Māori customs and usages to prevent the Crown from selling it. Their
Lordships overturned the ruling of the New Zealand courts that they had no
jurisdiction to question an assertion of title by the Crown or decide questions
Bristowe, supra note 50 at 155. Parker CJ’s unreported judgment is in [1880] 10 Printed Cases in
Appeals, Privy Council, Case 46, Record of Proceedings, in the Privy Council Office, London, copy on file
with the author.
52
9 Geo III, c 16, amended 24 & 25 Vict, c 62.
53
Bristowe, supra note 50 at 155.
54
[1901] AC 561[Nireaha Tamaki]. This decision effectively affirmed The Queen v Symonds (1847) [18401932] NZPCC 387 (NZSC) and overruled the contrary decision in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3
NZ Jur (NS) SC 72 (NZSC).
51
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of title between the Crown and the Māori.55 Lord Davey stated that “[t]heir
Lordships think that the Supreme Court are bound to recognise the fact of
the ‘rightful possession and occupation of the natives’ until extinguished in
accordance with law in any action in which [native] title is involved.”56 If
the appellant was able to prove that “he and the members of his tribe are in
possession and occupation of the lands in dispute under a native title which
has not been lawfully extinguished, he can maintain this action to restrain an
unauthorized invasion of his title.”57 This decision, rendered just thirteen
years after St. Catherine’s in relation to events from the 1870s to 1890s,
reveals that Aboriginal title, if established by sufficient evidence of
occupation of land under Indigenous customs and usages, entails legal rights
to possession enforceable against the Crown.58
In Re Southern Rhodesia,59 a 1919 Privy Council decision involving
the effect of the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty by conquest, Lord
Sumner commented on the rights of Indigenous peoples in British colonies
generally:
The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always
inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of
social organization that their usages and conceptions of rights
and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the
legal ideas of civilized society…. On the other hand, there are
indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently
55
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developed, are hardly less precise than our own. When once
they have been studied and understood they are no less
enforceable than rights arising under English law.60
These remarks, which show the influence of social evolution theory, have
been justly criticized for suggesting that some Indigenous peoples were too
“primitive” to have legal rights to the lands they occupied and used.61
However, the passage also reveals that Indigenous peoples can have land
rights that are enforceable in common law courts once their legal
conceptions have been “studied and understood,” which in the context of
legal proceedings means once adequate evidence of them has been
presented to the court by Indigenous witnesses, experts, and relevant
documents. In Re Southern Rhodesia, Lord Sumner said the evidence of
Indigenous property rights was “slender”, so “it was really a matter of
conjecture to say what the rights of the original ‘natives’ were.”62 In the St.
Catherine’s case, evidence of Ojibwe law was entirely absent, and yet
Chancellor Boyd did not hesitate to fill this evidentiary void himself with
erroneous assumptions about North American Indigenous societies generally
and Ojibwe society in particular.
Lord Sumner’s acceptance of the enforceability of Indigenous land
rights originating in Indigenous law was given effect by the Privy Council
two years later in Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria,63 which
involved a claim for compensation by a Nigerian chief for lands taken for
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public purposes in 1913 by the British Crown at Apapa in the territory the
White Cap Chiefs of Lagos ceded to the Crown in 1861. Viscount Haldane
held that the cession passed the “radical or ultimate title to the land” to the
Crown but did not affect the communal rights of the inhabitants under their
own laws.64

“A mere change in sovereignty,” he said, “is not to be

presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners; and the general terms
of a cession are prima facie to be construed accordingly.”65 He also
cautioned against trying to fit the rights of Indigenous peoples’ under their
own legal systems into the conceptual framework of the common law:
Their lordships make the preliminary observation that in
interpreting the native title to land, not only in Southern
Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire, much caution is
essential. There is a tendency operating at times unconsciously,
to render that title conceptually in terms which are appropriate
only to systems which have grown up under English law. But
this tendency has to be held in check closely. As a rule, in the
various systems of native jurisprudence throughout the Empire,
there is no such full division between property and possession
as English lawyers are familiar with. A very usual form of
native title is that of a usufructuary right, which is a mere
qualification of or burden on the radical or final title of the
Sovereign where that exists. In such cases the title of the
Sovereign is a pure legal estate, to which beneficial rights may
or may not be attached.66
Viscount Haldane referred to the St. Catherine’s case in this context, where
the characterization of Aboriginal title as usufructuary was based on the
Royal Proclamation of 1763, but what his judgment in Amodu Tijani reveals
64
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is that a usufructuary or other land right could also be derived from a system
of “native jurisprudence,” as long as adequate evidence of that jurisprudence
is presented to the court.
The evidence in Amodu Tijani demonstrated that, under Nigerian
customary law, the Lagos chiefs held land rights for the benefit of the
members of their community.67 Consequently, the Privy Council decided
that compensation for the full value of the expropriated land had to be paid
to the plaintiff chief who was then obliged to distribute it among the
members of his community in accordance with their customary rights.68
Their Lordships accordingly acknowledged that the usufructuary rights
under customary law, as revealed by the evidence, amounted to the entire
beneficial interest in the land. These rights continued after the cession of
sovereignty to the Crown in 1861.69 Re Southern Rhodesia and Amodu
Tijani are therefore consistent with regard to the law: they both held that the
land rights of Indigenous peoples under ascertainable customary law
continue after Crown acquisition of sovereignty. The difference between
them is that in Re Southern Rhodesia there was insufficient evidence of the
land rights of the inhabitants whereas in Amodi Tijani the Privy Council
found the evidence of the existence and nature of the local land rights to be
adequate for them to be enforceable against the Crown.

(a) Conclusions Regarding the St. Catherine’s Case
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In St. Catherine’s, Lord Watson’s conclusion that the Saulteaux’s
possession could only be attributed to the Royal Proclamation of 1763
amounted to a denial of common law rights based on possession of land and
of rights based on Indigenous law. Chancellor Boyd’s remarks about the
“primitive” nature of Saulteaux society and their lack of attachment to the
land would have provided the Privy Council with a false factual basis for
reaching these conclusions. The problem here, as we have seen, is that no
evidence was presented in the case to support Boyd C’s negative assessment
of Saulteaux society and land use. Instead, his views must have been based
on erroneous assumptions about Indigenous societies in North America that
were widely accepted in Euro-Canadian circles at the time. If adequate
evidence of Saulteaux land use and law had been presented at trial, the Privy
Council appeals we have examined from the Isle of Man, British Honduras,
New Zealand, and Africa suggest that their Lordships’ assessment of their
land rights could have been very different. Instead, Lord Watson’s decision
on the source and nature of Aboriginal title in Canada, like his judgment
with regard to the Indigenous peoples of Australia a few months later in
Cooper v Stuart, became the legal precedent on these matters for almost a
hundred years until his views began to be questioned in the modern case
law.
1. Cooper v Stuart
Unlike the St. Catherine’s case, Cooper v Stuart had nothing to do with
Indigenous land rights. Instead, it involved the validity of a reservation in an
1823 Crown grant of 1400 acres of land in the district of Sydney of “any
quantity of land, not exceeding ten acres, in any part of the said grant, as
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may be required for public purposes.”70 In 1882 the Crown by proclamation
resumed and fenced off ten acres of this land for a public park. The plaintiff,
who was the successor in title of the original grantee, brought an action for
an injunction to restrain the Crown from continuing in possession and for
damages.

He challenged the validity of the reservation on three main

grounds: (1) uncertainty, because the ten acres were not described; (2)
repugnancy, because the ten acre exception was inconsistent with the grant
of 1400 acres; and (3) violation of the common law rule against perpetuities,
by which a property interest, to be valid, must not be capable of vesting
beyond the perpetuity period of relevant lives in being at the time the interest
is created plus 21 years.
The Privy Council agreed with the decisions of the Primary Judge in
Equity and the Supreme Court of New South Wales on appeal in favour of
the Crown.71 Ignoring the uncertainty point because it does not appear to
have been argued before their Lordships, Lord Watson dismissed the
repugnancy argument summarily by deciding that the reservation of ten
acres operated as a defeasance rather than as an exemption. This technical
point need not deter us further, as it was only in the context of the
perpetuities issue that he referred to the status of New South Wales as a
settled colony.
In British colonial law, overseas colonies were classified as either
conquered/ceded or settled. In the former the Crown acquired sovereignty
derivatively by conquest and/or cession from another sovereign, whereas in
settled colonies, even if inhabited, it was presumed that there was no
sovereign and so the Crown could acquire the territory by asserting its own
70
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sovereignty unilaterally. The distinction had important legal consequences
because in conquered and ceded colonies there was an acknowledgement of
the existence of a pre-existing system of law that continued after Crown
acquisition of sovereignty to the extent that it was not unreasonable or
inconsistent with British conceptions of justice. In such colonies, English
law would not apply (at least insofar as the local population was concerned)
unless it was introduced by royal proclamation or legislative enactment.72
In Cooper v Stuart, Lord Watson noted that at the time of the grant of
the land in 1823 the laws of England had not been introduced into New
South Wales by Act or Ordinance. For those laws to have been in force, the
colony would have to be classified as a settlement. It was in this context that
his Lordship made his influential statement on the circumstances of the
Indigenous inhabitants and the status of the colony:
There is a great difference between the case of a Colony
acquired by conquest or cession, in which there is an
established system of law, and that of a Colony which consisted
of a tract of territory practically unoccupied, without settled
inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it was peacefully
annexed to the British dominions. The Colony of New South
Wales belongs to the latter class. In the case of such a Colony
the Crown may by ordinance, and the Imperial Parliament, or
its own legislature when it comes to possess one, may by statute
declare what parts of the common and statute law of England
shall have effect within its limits. But, when that is not done,
the law of England must (subject to well-established
72
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exceptions) become from the outset the law of the Colony, and
be administered by its tribunals.73
Lord Watson elaborated on this supposed state of affairs in relation to land
in the following passage:
There was no land law or tenure existing in the Colony at the
time of its annexation to the Crown; and, in that condition of
matters, the conclusion appears to their Lordships to be
inevitable that, as soon as colonial land became the subject of
settlement and commerce, all transactions in relation to it were
governed by English law, in so far as that law could be justly
and conveniently applied to them.74
Now if his Lordship had said that there was no land law or tenure suitable
for application to the British settlers, this assertion would not have been as
problematic. But clearly, in stating earlier in his judgment that the territory
that became New South Wales was “without settled inhabitants or settled
law,” he meant that the Indigenous peoples had no law.
In this way, Lord Watson was able to conclude that New South Wales,
and by implication the rest of Australia as well (New South Wales initially
included all of the eastern half of Australia from the Pacific coast inland to
the 135th meridian), was a settled colony in which English law applied
automatically from the outset. However, reception of English law in a
settled colony is limited to laws that are suitable for local conditions.
William Blackstone, in a passage quoted by Lord Watson, put it this way:
… colonists carry with them only so much of the English law as
is applicable to the condition of an infant Colony; such, for
instance, as the general rules of inheritance and protection from
personal injuries. The artificial requirements and distinctions
incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the
73
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laws of police and revenue (such especially as are enforced by
penalties), the mode of maintenance of the established Church,
the jurisdiction of spiritual Courts, and a multitude of other
provisions are neither necessary nor convenient for them, and
therefore are not in force.75
The question, then, was whether the rule against perpetuities was suitable for
the colony of New South Wales in 1823. The Privy Council decided that it
was, given that it is “an important feature of the common law … founded
upon plain considerations of policy.”76

However, this did not mean it

applied to grants by the Crown. Assuming it applied to the Crown in
England, Lord Watson said it would not necessarily follow that it applied in
the colony. The main purpose for granting lands in New South Wales was to
attract settlers, and it would have been impossible at the time to know what
land might be required later for public purposes. The best way to ensure that
land would be available for such purposes as the colony increased in
population would be for the government to retain the right to resume
portions of granted land indefinitely. For this reason, the Privy Council
decided that the rule against perpetuities did not apply to the Crown in the
colony and so the reservation of a right to resume ten acres was valid.
Even though it had nothing to do with Indigenous rights, Cooper v
Stuart became the leading authority on the status of Australia as settled and
on the absence of Indigenous law.77 Although related, these are separate
issues.
75
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determines, as we have seen, whether English or local law is in force. It also
determines the prerogative powers of the Crown, as in conquered and ceded
colonies (unlike settlements) the Crown has legislative authority until
English law is introduced or a legislative assembly is promised or created.78
Classification of a colony as settled means that there was no sovereign
recognized as such by the British Crown, but it does not follow that there
was no local law prior to colonization. In Africa, the Gold Coast (Ghana)
and Kenya are examples of settled colonies with acknowledged local
systems of customary law.79 In Canada, British Columbia must have been
settled because there was no conquest of or cession from the Indigenous
peoples, and yet they had their own legal systems, which, although not
respected by the Crown, were never entirely suppressed.80
When Lord Watson stated that New South Wales “was peacefully
annexed to the British dominions” at a time when it was “practically
unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law,”81 he was clearly
expressing factual findings that should have required supporting evidence.
No such evidence is to be found in the trial judgment, in which Primary
Judge Manning simply applied common law precedents without any mention
of the condition of the Indigenous peoples or of how New South Wales had
been acquired. Nor were these matters referred to by the justices of the New
78
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South Wales Supreme Court on appeal. Lord Watson himself said “[t]here
are no facts in dispute,”82 and yet he reached factual conclusions that were
certainly based on assumptions rather than evidence.

Moreover, those

assumptions were patently wrong. New South Wales was not acquired
peacefully; on the contrary, violence against the Indigenous inhabitants was
a common feature of the colonization process. In Coe v Commonwealth of
Australia, Murphy J (dissenting on other grounds) observed:
Although the Privy Council referred in Cooper v. Stuart to
peaceful annexation, the aborigines did not give up their lands
peacefully; they were killed or removed forcibly from the lands
by United Kingdom forces or the European colonists in what
amounted to attempted (and in Tasmania almost complete)
genocide. The statement by the Privy Council may be regarded
either as having been made in ignorance or as a convenient
falsehood to justify the taking of aborigines’ land.83
Lord Watson’s observation that New South Wales was “without
settled inhabitants or settled law” was also incorrect.

The Indigenous

inhabitants were intimately connected to the land and had extensive
knowledge of the geography and natural resources upon which they
depended for their existence.84

They also had social and governance

structures which, although vastly different from those in Europe, were suited
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to their worldviews and ways of life.85 Their relationships with one another
and the lands, waters, animals, and plants were governed by complex
systems of law that were no doubt not generally perceived by the British
settlers, in part because these laws were not written down, but more
significantly because in the Eurocentric and racist minds of most settlers the
Indigenous peoples were too “primitive” to have laws.86 This view was
evidently shared by the members of the Privy Council who decided Cooper
v Stuart.
As we have seen, when the case was heard in the 1880s social
evolution theorists generally ranked human societies on a scale ranging from
savage through barbaric up to civilized. Proponents of this theory thought
that societies tended to progress from the lower to the higher levels through
a process similar to the evolution of species, with European societies
naturally at the top. Lewis Henry Morgan, a prominent and influential
proponent of social evolution theory, in his book, Ancient Society: or
Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery Through
Barbarism to Civilization, published in 1877, made this stark assessment:
“The Australians rank below the Polynesians, and far below the American
aborigines. They stand below the African negro and near the bottom of the
scale. Their social institutions, therefore, must approach the primitive type
as nearly as those of any existing people.”87
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Catherine’s case, views of this kind seeped into judicial thinking and may
well have influenced Lord Watson’s assumption that Australia was “without
settled inhabitants or settled law” when it became a British colony.

1. The Modern Case Law
(a) Australia
(i) Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty
The first Australian case to address the issue of Indigenous land rights
directly was Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty,88 decided by the Supreme Court of
the Northern Territory in 1971. The action was brought by members of the
Rirratjingu, Gumatj, and Djapu clans, for themselves and the other members
thereof, to prevent the defendant company from mining bauxite on lands on
the Gove Peninsula in the Northern Territory to which the plaintiffs claimed
exclusive rights. As summarized by Justice Blackburn,
The plaintiffs’ central contention was that at common law the
rights, under native law or custom, of native communities to
land within territory acquired by the Crown, provided that these
rights were intelligible and capable of recognition by the
common law, were rights which persisted, and must be
respected by the Crown itself and by its colonizing subjects,
unless and until they were validly terminated.89
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The plaintiffs contended that their proprietary rights were still in existence
and that these rights had been unlawfully invaded by Nabalco. They asked
the court for declarations that they “are entitled to the occupation and
enjoyment of the subject land free from interference”; that the Minerals
(Acquisition) Ordinance 1953 was ultra vires and void to the extent that it
purported to vest the bauxite and other minerals in the Crown; and that “the
Commonwealth had no interest in the subject land enabling it effectively to
grant any leases or other rights over it.”90 They also requested an injunction
and damages.
The Commonwealth, as one of the defendants, contended that the
1953 Ordinance and the subsequent Mining (Gove Peninsula Nabalco
Agreement) Ordinance 1968, which approved an agreement granting the
mineral lease to Nabalco for the purpose of mining bauxite, were valid and
consequently the lease was also valid. The defendant company relied on the
lease to justify its presence and activities on the land.
Justice Blackburn said the following question of fact had to be
decided: “what, in the plaintiffs’ own eyes, is their relationship to the subject
land?”91 Then there were questions of law. How could that relationship be
proved?

Does the common law contain a doctrine of native title as

propounded by counsel for the plaintiffs?

If it does, is the plaintiffs’

relationship to the land such as to bring it within that doctrine? And what
has been the legal effect of events and legislation since 1788 when New
South Wales (which then, from the Crown’s perspective, included the
subject lands) was first settled by the British?

90
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After dealing with and dismissing the defendants’ objections to the
admissibility of the oral evidence of the clan members and the two
anthropologists who testified as experts, Justice Blackburn assessed the
evidence of the plaintiffs’ way of life, including their social organization and
laws relating to land. Helpfully, the defendants had agreed that, if
… the Court made findings of fact about the clan system and
about the land-holding system in the period immediately before
the establishment of the Mission [the Yirrkala Methodist
Mission, the first permanent non-Aboriginal settlement on the
subject lands, established in 1935], the defendants would admit
that the systems of clan organization and of land holding had
existed in 1788 and continuously thereafter, but this did not
involve any admission that any particular clan had held any
particular area of land since that time.92
Turning to the issue of the clans’ relationship with the land, Blackburn J
remarked that it is undoubtedly “a religious relationship,” as “the physical
and spiritual universes are not felt as distinct.”93

Considering all the

evidence, he concluded that “the aboriginals do, as their counsel contended,
think of the subject land as consisting of a number of tracts of land each
linked to a clan, the total of which exhausts the subject land, though the
boundaries between them are not precise in the sense in which boundaries
are understood in our law.”94
This factual conclusion did not, however, lead Justice Blackburn to
conclude that the clans have a legal right to the subject land at common law.
Relying on Re Southern Rhodesia,95 he stated that their rights under their
own laws and customs would have to be proprietary in order to give rise to
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common law land rights.96

The problem was not that the clans lacked

discernible laws and customs in relation to land. On the contrary, Blackburn
J said:
The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly
adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which
provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from
the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system
could be called “a government of laws and not of men”, it is that
shown in the evidence before me.97
Instead, the hurdle the plaintiffs were unable to overcome was convincing
him that their laws give them rights that are proprietary in nature. He
observed:
The evidence seems to me to show that the aboriginals have a
more cogent feeling of obligation to the land than of ownership
of it. It is dangerous to attempt to express a matter so subtle and
difficult by a mere aphorism, but it seems easier, on the
evidence, to say that the clan belongs to the land than that the
land belongs to the clan.98
One can criticize Justice Blackburn’s legal conclusion that the clans’
relationship with the land was not proprietary for being too dependent on
English law criteria, such as the right to alienate and the right to exclude
others from the land.99 Nevertheless, he also denied the plaintiffs’ claim as a
matter of law by questionable interpretation of the jurisprudence from
Africa, India, New Zealand, and the United States,100 which led him to
conclude that there is no common law doctrine of communal native title. So
96
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regardless of the extensive evidence of the plaintiffs’ laws and land use, their
case was bound to fail on Blackburn J’s understanding of the law.
In concluding that the plaintiffs did not have land rights to which the
common law could give effect, Justice Blackburn also relied on Lord
Watson’s judgments in the St. Catherine’s case and Cooper v Stuart.101 We
have seen that, in the former case, Lord Watson based his decision that the
only source of Indigenous land rights in Canada is the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 on Chancellor Boyd’s prejudiced assumptions rather than on actual
facts. In Cooper v Stuart, there was no evidence at all for Lord Watson’s
conclusion that New South Wales was “without settled inhabitants or settled
law, at the time when it was peacefully annexed to the British dominions.”102
Nonetheless, Blackburn J thought he was bound by the ruling in that case
that New South Wales was a settled colony because the classification of a
colony as conquered and ceded or settled is a matter of law.103 The problem
here is that, even if one admits that the classification is a matter of law, it
must have a factual basis. Lord Watson concluded that New South Wales
was settled because he made an erroneous assumption of fact, namely that
the territory was “without settled inhabitants or settled law.” When the
factual basis for a legal conclusion is shown to be false, the conclusion is
undercut and should no longer be regarded as having precedential value. As
respected English jurist Herbert Broom succinctly put it, “[i]f the fact be
perverted or misrepresented the law which arises thence will unavoidably be
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unjust or partial.”104 However, it was no doubt too late in 1971 to change
the classification of New South Wales to conquered, as it had been assumed
since 1788 that English law had been received at that time because the
colony was settled.105 Nonetheless, if Blackburn J had viewed the plaintiffs’
relationship with the land as proprietary, he could have decided that the
reception of English law did not obliterate their land rights under their own
laws and customs, without reclassifying New South Wales.106 This would
have entailed rejection of Lord Watson’s erroneous assumption – which,
from a common law perspective,107 was clearly a matter of fact rather than of
law – that “[t]here was no land law or tenure existing in the colony at the
time of its annexation to the Crown.”108 While acknowledging that Lord
Watson’s assumption was mistaken, Blackburn J nonetheless ruled that
English law, including real property law, applied throughout New South
Wales from 1788 on, even on the far-off Gove Peninsula where no English
person settled until 1935, and then only missionaries arrived. Included was
the doctrine of tenure, the effect of which he described in stark terms:
… the Crown is the source of title to all land; … no subject can
own land allodially, but only an estate or interest in it which he
holds mediately or immediately of the Crown. On the
foundation of New South Wales, therefore, every square inch of
territory in the colony became the property of the Crown. All
titles, rights, and interests whatever in land which existed
thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the direct consequence
of some grant from the Crown. The plaintiffs, who cannot point
104
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to any grant from the Crown as the basis of the title which they
claim, cannot succeed unless they can show there is a doctrine in
their favour which in Australia co-exists in some manner with
the dominion of the Crown.109
Since the plaintiffs were unable to convince Justice Blackburn that their
relationship with the land was proprietary or that the common law contains a
doctrine of communal native title, they lost their case despite the evidence in
their favour. The Milirrpum decision was not appealed, and another 20
years would pass before the issue of the existence of Indigenous land rights
reached the High Court of Australia in Mabo v Queensland [No 2].110

(ii) Mabo No 2
The Mabo No 2 litigation was commenced directly in the High Court
in 1982 by Eddie Mabo, Celuia Mapo Salee, Sam Passi, David Passi, and
James Rice, members of the Meriam People who occupy the Murray Islands
in the Torres Strait off the northern tip of mainland Queensland.111 The
High Court thus had jurisdiction over both the factual and legal issues,
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though instead of conducting a trial itself it remitted the fact-finding role to
Justice Moynihan of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
The islands in the Torres Strait had been annexed to the Colony of
Queensland in 1879 pursuant to Letters Patent issued by Queen Victoria.
The plaintiffs alleged that acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown, which
they did not challenge, did not impair the pre-existing land rights of the
Murray Islanders based on their traditional laws and customs. In 1985, the
Queensland Parliament passed the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory
Act 1985 (Q), an unabashed attempt to stop the litigation in its tracks by
declaring that all the lands on the Torres Strait Islands became vested in the
Crown at the moment the islands were annexed in 1879.112 That enactment
resulted in Mabo v Queensland [No 1],113 in which the High Court decided
that the statute conflicted with Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
because it discriminated against the Islanders on the basis of race and so was
invalid.114 That decision meant that the plaintiffs’ case could proceed.
In 1989, Justice Moynihan delivered his factual findings to the High
Court, which then proceeded to decide the case on the basis of these findings
and the applicable law. The factual findings, which comprise 229 typescript
pages, provided detailed information on the people of the Murray Islands
and their society, culture, and relationship with the land.115 The evidence
revealed that there was no public or common land on the Murray Islands, as
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all the land belonged either to individuals or groups.116 While unable to
make findings regarding the precise details of the landholding laws and
customs of the Meriam People, Justice Moynihan was nonetheless able to
conclude from the evidence that the Islanders had land rights under their
own legal system. In the High Court, Justice Brennan, delivering the main
judgment,117 stated:
Whatever be the precision of Meriam laws and customs with
respect to land, there is abundant evidence that land was
traditionally occupied by individuals or family groups and that
contemporary rights and interests are capable of being
established with sufficient precision to attract declaratory or
other relief. Although the findings made by Moynihan J. do not
permit a confident conclusion that, in 1879, there were parcels
of land in the Murray Islands owned allodially by individuals or
groups, the absence of such a finding is not critical to the final
resolution of this case.118
It was then up to the High Court to decide whether, as a matter of law,
those rights and interests survived the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty.119
All the judges except Dawson J were of the opinion that they not only
survived but also continued until validly extinguished by the Crown.120 In
so deciding, the Court distinguished between acquisition of sovereignty and
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acquisition of land.121 While not overruling the Privy Council’s decision in
Cooper v Stuart that Australia was a settled colony, the majority concluded
that acquisition of sovereignty did not necessarily entail acquisition of title
to land, aside from the Crown’s radical or underlying title that supports the
doctrine of tenure “which could not be overturned without fracturing the
skeleton which gives our land law its shape and consistency.”122 Referring
to Lord Watson’s dictum in Cooper v Stuart that New South Wales was
“without settled inhabitants or settled law,” Brennan J said it was an
“assumption that proved false,” as revealed by the evidence in the Milirrpum
case:
The facts as we know them today do not fit the “absence of
law” or “barbarian” theory underpinning the colonial reception
of the common law of England…. The theory that the
Indigenous inhabitants of a “settled” colony had no proprietary
interest in the land thus depended on a discriminatory
denigration of indigenous inhabitants, their social organization
and customs.123
In a clear rejection of the kinds of attitudes towards Indigenous peoples
revealed in the St. Catherine’s case and Cooper v Stuart and of the social
evolution mindset expressed in Re Southern Rhodesia, Brennan J added that
“doctrines of the common law which depend on the notion that native
peoples may be ‘so low in the scale of social organization’ that it is ‘idle to
impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law’ can
hardly be retained…. [I]t is imperative in today’s world that the common
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law should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial
discrimination.”124
Justice Brennan seems to have thought it would require a change in
the common law for the pre-existing land rights of the Indigenous
inhabitants of settled territories to be acknowledged.125 But this was not so.
Milirrpum did have to be overruled, it is true, but that was only a trial court
decision where Justice Blackburn felt bound by Cooper v Stuart insofar as
the classification of New South Wales as settled was concerned. But Cooper
v Stuart had nothing to do with Indigenous land rights and erroneously
assumed, as Brennan J pointed out, that Indigenous Australians had no law.
If, as in Mabo No 2, the factual basis for pre-existing land rights had been
established in a case that went to the Privy Council, it is not at all apparent
that their Lordships would have denied the existence of those rights. On the
contrary, we have seen that in appeals from the Isle of Man, British
Honduras, Southern Rhodesia, Nigeria, and New Zealand, both before and
after Cooper v Stuart, the Privy Council envisaged, and in some cases
accepted, the existence of Indigenous land rights based on occupation of
lands in accordance with Indigenous law and custom.126

Nor was the

continuation of land rights in those cases determined by the distinction
between settled and conquered or ceded colonies. What was different was
that in the latter class of colonies the pre-existence of law was a given
because the colony had been acquired from another sovereign, whereas in
settled colonies it was assumed that there was no law because, from the
British perspective, there was no sovereign. Evidence of pre-existing laws
124
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was therefore required, but it was not presented in Cooper v Stuart because
the case involved the application of the rule against perpetuities to a Crown
grant, not Indigenous land rights.

By way of contrast, in Mabo No 2

extensive evidence of the laws and customs of the Murray Islanders was
received by Justice Moynihan and transmitted to the High Court, revealing
that they had pre-existing land rights under their own laws at the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty in 1879.127 This evidence provided the Court
with the factual basis to issue a declaration acknowledging the Islanders’
rights “as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and
enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands.”128

(a) Canada
Lord Watson’s dicta in the St. Catherine’s case that Aboriginal title is “a
personal and usufructuary right” derived from the Royal Proclamation of
SEK Hulme argued in “Aspects of the High Court’s Handling of Mabo” (1993) 87 Vict Bar News 29
that the Court should not have used a case involving unique facts pertaining to the Murray Islanders to
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1763, and a mere burden on the Crown’s “substantial and paramount”
proprietary estate,129 informed legal and political perceptions of Indigenous
land rights in Canada up until (and even after) the Supreme Court of
Canada’s 1973 decision in Calder v Attorney-General of British
Columbia.130

(i) Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia
In Calder, the Nisga’a Nation (spelled Nishga in the judgments) sought a
declaration that their Aboriginal title to lands in north-western British
Columbia had never been lawfully extinguished. Although the majority of
the Supreme Court dismissed the action on a technical procedural point,131
six of the seven judges decided that Aboriginal title existed as a legal right in
British Columbia, though three thought it had been legislatively
extinguished prior to the entry of the province into Canada in 1871.132
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Referring to Lord Watson’s decision in St. Catherine’s, Justice Judson
observed that “[t]here can be no doubt that the Privy Council found that
the Proclamation of 1763 was the origin of the Indian title,” but this did not
mean it was the title’s “exclusive source.”133 In his view, the Proclamation
has never applied in British Columbia because the province has its own
history and is outside that document’s geographical limits. Nonetheless, in
an oft-cited passage he regarded it to be clear that, although
… Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its origin to
the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers
came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and
occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.
This is what Indian title means and it does not help one in the
solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary
right”. What they are asserting in this action is that they had a
right to continue to live on their lands as their forefathers had
lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished.134
Judson J’s judgment thus undercut Lord Watson’s decision on both the
source and the nature of Aboriginal title. While not elaborating on the
nature of the title because he thought it had been extinguished, Judson J
clearly regarded occupation of land by organized Indigenous societies as its
source.
Justice Hall disagreed with Judson J on the application of the Royal
Proclamation – for him, it followed the flag as England extended its
jurisdiction westward across the continent.135 But like Justice Judson, he did
not regard it as the source of Aboriginal title in British Columbia; instead, it
was declaratory of land rights that already existed. So what was the source
of these rights?
133

Hall J identified two sources: the common law and
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Indigenous law. Regarding the first source, he observed that “[p]ossession is
of itself at common law proof of ownership…. Unchallenged possession is
admitted here.”136 On the second source, he reviewed testimony from the
trial about Nisga’a land laws and concluded: “What emerges from the
foregoing evidence is the following: the Nishgas in fact are and were from
time immemorial a distinctive cultural entity with concepts of ownership
indigenous to their culture and capable of articulation under the common
law.”137

Whether based on possession or on Indigenous concepts of

ownership, Aboriginal title thus has a factual basis: it depends on proof (or
admission) of occupation of land or of Indigenous law: “Unlike the method
used to make out title in other contexts,” Hall J said, “proof of the Indian
title or interest is to be made out as a matter of fact.”138
It is in this regard that St. Catherine’s and Calder differ: in the former
case, there was no admission or evidence of Indigenous occupation or law,
whereas in the latter there was. This permitted both Judson J and Hall J to
distinguish Lord Watson’s judgment and decide that the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 is not the source of Indigenous land rights. But this also meant that
the content of these rights does not depend on interpretation of the
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Proclamation. For this reason, the Supreme Court, in the next important
Aboriginal title case, Delgamuukw v British Columbia,139 was able to depart
from Lord Watson’s characterization of Aboriginal title as “a personal and
usufructuary right” and, subject to a couple of limitations,140 define it in
terms very close to full ownership.

(i) Delgamuukw v British Columbia
The Delgamuukw case involved claims by the Gitxsan (spelled
Gitksan in the judgments) and Wet’suwet’en Nations to Aboriginal title and
self-government over their traditional territories in north-central British
Columbia.141 The Supreme Court sent the case back to trial for the existence
of Aboriginal title to be determined in accordance with the guidelines the
Court laid down and for the self-government issue to be addressed in more
detail (the case has not been retried).142 Chief Justice Lamer wrote the
judgment, with McLachlin J (as she then was) concurring and La Forest and
L’Heureux-Dubé JJ concurring in the result but offering separate reasons.
The parts of the Chief Justice’s judgment that are relevant here deal
with the interrelated issues of the source and content of Aboriginal title.
Regarding source, he stated:
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It had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal title
in Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see
St. Catherine’s Milling. However, it is now clear that although
aboriginal title was recognized by the Proclamation, it arises
from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples.
That prior occupation, however, is relevant in two different
ways, both of which illustrate the sui generis nature of
aboriginal title. The first is the physical fact of occupation,
which derives from the common law principle that occupation
is proof of possession in law. Thus, in Guerin,[143]… Dickson
J. described aboriginal title, at p. 376, as a “legal right derived
from the Indians’ historic occupation and possession of their
tribal lands”. What makes aboriginal title sui generis is that it
arises from possession before the assertion of British
sovereignty, whereas normal estates, like fee simple, arise
afterward…. This idea has been further developed in Roberts v.
Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, where this Court unanimously
held at p. 340 that “aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the
British and survived British claims of sovereignty” (also see
Guerin, at p. 378). What this suggests is a second source for
aboriginal title – the relationship between common law and preexisting systems of aboriginal law.144
In this important passage, Lamer CJ confirmed (without citing in this
context) Justice Hall’s view in Calder that Indigenous land rights have two
interrelated sources, namely the common law and Indigenous law.145
However, neither of these judges made the relationship between these two
systems of law clear. Elsewhere in his judgment, Lamer CJ suggested that
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Indigenous law has a role in proving the exclusive occupation of land giving
rise to title at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty:
… the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title
may have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation,
such that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence
against exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which
permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or
reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of
exclusive occupation.146
He also said that “if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society
had laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to establishing the
occupation of lands which are the subject of a claim for aboriginal title.
Relevant laws might include, but are not limited to, a land tenure system or
laws governing land use.”147

From these passages, it would seem that

Indigenous law is not an independent source of Aboriginal title in Canada,
but just part of the evidence that can be used to prove the exclusive
occupation necessary to give rise to the title at common law.

This

interpretation might be reinforced by Lamer CJ’s statement that “the source
of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the common law and in the
aboriginal perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their
systems of law. It follows that both should be taken into account in
establishing the proof of occupancy.”148
However, in deciding that “the relationship between common law and
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law” is a second source of Aboriginal
title, Chief Justice Lamer relied on Roberts v Canada, where a unanimous
Supreme Court held that “aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the
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British and survived British claims of sovereignty.”149

This suggests

reliance on the doctrine of continuity, whereby pre-existing rights are
maintained and become enforceable in common law courts after sovereignty
is acquired by the Crown.150 He said as well that Aboriginal title “is also sui
generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained
by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules
of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal
rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and
aboriginal perspectives.”151 And yet, when it came to describing the content
of Aboriginal title, he did so in a generic way that would apply equally to
Aboriginal titleholders across Canada, regardless of their own laws that can
vary greatly from one Indigenous nation to another.152 He said this:
… the content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two
propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to
exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that
title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those
aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to
distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected
uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s
attachment to that land. 153
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This description of Aboriginal title which, as he later specified, includes
natural resources on and under the land, including oil and natural gas,154 is a
clear rejection of Lord Watson’s characterization of Aboriginal title as “a
personal and usufructuary right.”155
So what is the relevance of Indigenous law to Aboriginal title in
Canada? Although not articulated in this way by the Chief Justice, my
understanding is that its relevance is two-fold. As he did say, one function
of Indigenous law is to provide additional evidence of exclusive occupation,
which then gives rise to the generic interest described in the above quotation
that entails proprietary rights against the outside world.156 But in addition to
that, Indigenous law must apply internally to define Aboriginal title rights
and interests among the titleholders themselves.

The Aboriginal title

described by Lamer CJ is a communal interest vested in the whole
Indigenous nation, and yet his description provides no indication of how the
land rights and interests are distributed, held, and regulated within the
nation, other than to say that “[d]ecisions with respect to that land are also
made by that community.”157 A second function of Indigenous law therefore
must be to govern Indigenous landholding within Indigenous communities.
This interpretation is consistent with Lamer CJ’s holding that the Aboriginal
title’s “characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to
the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in
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aboriginal legal systems.”158 In short, the former rules apply externally and
the latter apply internally.159 From a practical as well as a legal perspective,
it cannot be otherwise: when the Crown supposedly asserted sovereignty
over the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en territories, which the Supreme Court
accepted as having happened in 1846,160 the Crown exercised no authority
there and no means would have been available for applying English law. So
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en laws must have continued to apply to determine
land rights within their territories, both because that would have been
culturally appropriate and because no other law was available for that
purpose. In the absence of valid legislative extinguishment of these laws
prior to 1982 when they would have been recognized and affirmed by
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,161 they should continue to govern
Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en land rights internally today.162
In Delgamuukw, as in Calder, what allowed the Court to distinguish
the St. Catherine’s decision, on both the source and the content of
Aboriginal title, was evidence of Indigenous law and occupation of land. In
Delgamuukw, this evidence was extensive – the trial took 374 days spread
over three years, most of which involved presentation of evidence of Gitxsan
and Wet’suwet’en laws and their relationship with the land. While not
willing to make a decision on the merits, as explained above, the Supreme
158
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Court did conclude from this evidence that Aboriginal title is sourced in
Indigenous occupation and law, rather than in the Royal Proclamation of
1763, and is not limited to “a personal and usufructuary right”. Then, in
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,163 the Court applied the doctrine laid
down in Delgamuukw and, for the first time in Canadian judicial history,
issued a declaration of Aboriginal title.

(i) Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia
The trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation was also lengthy, consuming 339 court days.
As in Delgamuukw, most of the testimony was on the Indigenous claimants’
laws and relationship with the land, as detailed in Justice Vickers’ detailed
trial judgment.164 On the basis of this evidence, Chief Justice McLachlin,
for a unanimous Supreme Court, was of the opinion that, as found by
Vickers J, Aboriginal title to approximately half the claim area had been
established.165 No reference to the St. Catherine’s case was made in her
judgment, revealing how far the Court had moved from that precedent. She
relied instead on Delgamuukw, where the
… Court confirmed the sui generis nature of the rights and
obligations to which the Crown’s relationship with Aboriginal
peoples gives rise, and stated that what makes Aboriginal title
unique is that it arises from possession before the assertion of
British sovereignty, as distinguished from other estates such as
fee simple that arise afterward. The dual perspectives of the
common law and of the Aboriginal group bear equal weight in
evaluating a claim for Aboriginal title.166
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 4.
[2008] 1 CNLR 112 (BCSC).
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The Chief Justice thus confirmed and applied the ruling in Delgamuukw that
Aboriginal title is based on exclusive occupation of land at the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty, which was again taken to be 1846 in British
Columbia.167 She did not, however, refer to Lamer CJ’s opinion that “the
relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal
law” is a second source of Aboriginal title.168 As revealed in the passage
just quoted, her view of the role of Indigenous law was expressed in vague
terms.169
Regarding the content of Aboriginal title, Chief Justice McLachlin
confirmed what had been established in Delgamuukw, namely that
… Aboriginal title “encompasses the right to exclusive use and
occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of
purposes” ([Delgamuukw,] para. 117), including non-traditional
purposes, provided these uses can be reconciled with the
communal and ongoing nature of the group’s attachment to the
land. Subject to this inherent limit, the title-holding group has
the right to choose the uses to which the land is put and to enjoy
its economic fruits.170
She elaborated as follows:
Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those
associated with fee simple, including: the right to decide how
the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of
the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic
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benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and
manage the land.171
As Aboriginal title is an entire beneficial interest, the underlying title the
Crown acquired with sovereignty has no beneficial content whatsoever.172
Summing up the modern Canadian case law, in light of extensive
evidence of Indigenous land use and law, Supreme Court decisions starting
with Calder in 1973 have rejected Lord Watson’s opinion that the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 is the source Aboriginal title. Instead, it is based on
the common law rule that ownership can be derived from possession and the
doctrine that pre-existing land rights continue after Crown acquisition of
sovereignty. As the content of Aboriginal title depends largely on its source,
the Court has also rejected Lord Watson’s characterization of the title as “a
personal and usufructuary right” and decided that it amounts to the entire
beneficial interest in the land. The existence of Aboriginal title is thus a
matter of fact that depends on evidence of exclusive occupation, which can
be established by proof of physical presence on and use of the land and by
Indigenous law.

1. Conclusion
Our examination of the modern case law has revealed just how far the
highest courts in Australia and Canada have moved from the early
precedents of Cooper v Stuart and St. Catherine’s on the existence, sources,
and content of Indigenous land rights. While this might be thought of as
amounting to substantial modification of the law,173 the analysis in this
171
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article has revealed that those early pronouncements of the Privy Council
were made in factual vacuums, with erroneous assumptions about
Indigenous societies and their relationships with the land being made in the
complete absence of any evidence in relation to those matters.
By way of contrast, in the modern cases in both countries extensive
evidence of the cultures and laws of the Indigenous peoples concerned and
of their relationships with the land has been presented. This evidence has
permitted the judges to apply elements of the common law going back well
before those Privy Council decisions from the 1880s, specifically the
principle that possession of land is proof of ownership and the doctrine that
pre-existing rights continue when the Crown extends its sovereignty over
new territory. These common law doctrines have provided the courts with
two potential sources of Indigenous land rights, namely occupation of land
and Indigenous law. Depending on which source is applied, the content of
the land rights is then determined by common law principles in relation to
possession, Indigenous laws, or a combination of the two. In Australia, the
High Court has adopted the Indigenous law approach,174 whereas in Canada
the Supreme Court has applied the common law to determine the content of
Aboriginal title externally, leaving space for the application of Indigenous
law internally.
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